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   Abstract ⎯ With the recent proliferation of distributed systems 
and networking, remote authentication has become a crucial task 
in many networking applications. Various schemes have been 
proposed so far for the two-party remote authentication; 
however, some of them have been proved to be insecure. In this 
paper, we propose an efficient timestamp-based password 
authentication scheme using smart cards. We show various types 
of forgery attacks against a previously proposed 
timestamp-based password authentication scheme and improve 
that scheme to ensure robust security for the remote 
authentication process, keeping all the advantages that were 
present in that scheme. Our scheme successfully defends the 
attacks that could be launched against other related previous 
schemes. We present a detailed cryptanalysis of previously 
proposed Shen et. al’s scheme and an analysis of the improved 
scheme to show its improvements and efficiency.  
 
   Keywords ⎯ Mutual, Remote, Server, Smart Card  
 
1. Introduction 
 
   Remote Authentication is an important task in many 
networking applications. The legitimate users might have to 
login to the system remotely. One of the major hurdles in 
remote authentication process is ensuring robust security 
while using an insecure channel at the time of communications 
between the user and the authentication server. Various works 
addressed this issue from different perspectives which include 
password-table driven schemes, id-based schemes, timestamp 
based schemes, nonce-based schemes etc. Nonetheless, many 
of the works which dealt with this issue are able to provide 
only the unilateral authentication where the server is 
considered to be completely secured and only the legitimacy 
of the user(s) could be verified. As the adversaries could 
intercept the login requests from the users and might pretend 
to be the legitimate server(s) to the users, there must be some 
sorts of mechanisms to ensure authentication in both 
directions, which is termed as bilateral or mutual 
authentication. One of the mutual authentication (or, 
verification) schemes proposed earlier is Shen et. al. scheme 
[1] which is basically based on the basic timestamp-based 
scheme proposed by Yang and Shieh [2]. In this paper, we 
propose an improved timestamp-based mutual authentication 
scheme which is adapted from Shen et. al. scheme. We 
eliminate the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Shen et. al. 
scheme to provide enhanced security for remote authentication 
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process using smart cards. We also show a new type of attack 
and some already identified attacks and weaknesses of Shen et. 
al. scheme. In addition to ensuring robust security, our scheme 
allows mutual verification among the participating entities and 
password renewal by the users. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states 
the related works, Section 3 reviews Shen et. al. scheme, 
Section 4 presents a review of various types of attacks and 
weaknesses of Shen et. al. scheme, Section 5 contains the 
details of our proposed scheme, Section 6 presents the analysis 
of our scheme and finally Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Works 
 
   In 1999, Yang and Shieh [2] proposed two password 
authentication schemes with smart cards one of which was the 
timestamp-based password authentication scheme. In 2002, 
Chan and Cheng [3] showed that [2] is vulnerable to forged 
login attack and an adversary could be able to impersonate as a 
legal user to pass the system authentication. Fan et. al. [4] 
presented a cryptanalysis of [2] and showed another type of 
attack different than that is in [3] and also proposed an 
enhanced scheme which could withstand Chan-Cheng attack 
and their demonstrated attack. But, later [5] showed that, Fan 
et. al. scheme was still insecure and vulnerable to forged login 
attack. Again, [6] showed two other attacks on Fan et. al.’s 
enhanced scheme. Shen et. al. [1] came up with one enhanced 
scheme based on [2] which they claimed to be efficient enough 
to protect the authentication process from forged login or 
forged server attacks. Unfortunately, later [7], [8] and [9] 
showed that the improved scheme proposed by Shen et. al. was 
still vulnerable to the forgery attacks. Wang and Li [10] 
proposed another improved scheme based on Yang-Shieh 
scheme [2] assuming that the remote host had an extra storage 
for storing certain information.  
   Our proposed scheme is different than all of the mentioned 
schemes and overcomes the drawbacks of these existing 
schemes. Our Analysis shows that, it could well-defend all the 
attacks that are presented by these previous works. Moreover, 
if required, our scheme keeps almost all the advantages that 
were present in the other schemes. 
  
3. Review of Shen Et. Al.’s Scheme 
 
   In this section we briefly review the Shen et. al. scheme [1]. 
First we note down the terms and preliminaries used 
throughout the rest of the paper. 
3.1   Basic Terms  
Ui – The ith user seeking for authentication by the server 
KIC – The Key Information Center which is responsible for 
generating key information, issuing smart cards to new users 
and serving password-changing requests for registered users 
IDi – The identity of the user Ui 
PWi – The password chosen by the user Ui 
CIDi – The identity of the smart card associated to the user Ui 
f(.) – A one-way function 
3.2   Shen et. al.’s Timestamp-Based Scheme 
As this scheme is a modified and enhanced version of 
Yang-Shieh scheme [2], like [2] it also contains three phases 
for the authentication process: registration phase, login phase 
and authentication phase. 
 
Registration Phase. In this phase, the KIC sets up the 
authentication system and issues smart cards to Ui who 
requests for registration. It is assumed that, this phase occurs 
over a secure channel. The steps that the KIC follows in this 
phase are: 
1. Ui securely submits IDi and PWi to the KIC. 
2. Two large prime numbers p and q are generated, and let n= 
p•q 
3. A prime number e and an integer d are chosen which satisfy, 
e•d ≡ 1 mod (p-1)(q-1), where, e is the public key of the KIC 
that should be published and d is the secret key that is kept 
secret. 
4. An integer g is found which is a primitive element in both 
GF(p) and GF(q), where g is the public information of the 
KIC. 
5. Si = IDid mod n is computed as Ui’s secret information. 
6. hi for Ui is computed such that, hi = gPWi• d mod n. 
7. CIDi is computed as, CIDi = f(IDi ⊕ d), where ⊕ stands for 
an exclusive operation. 
8. Then the information n, e, g, IDi, CIDi, Si, hi and f(.) are 
written into the smart card’s memory and the card is issued to 
Ui 
 
Login Phase. When Ui needs to login to the system, the smart 
card should be attached to the login device and IDi and PWi 
need to be keyed in. After that, the smart cards performs the 
following operations: 
1. Generates a random number ri and computes Xi and Yi as 
follows: 
Xi = gri•PWi mod n 
Yi = Si•hiri•f(CIDi ,T) mod n 
Here, T is the current timestamp. 
2. Sends the login request message, M = {IDi, CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, e, 
g, T} to the remote server. 
 
Verification Phase. In this phase, the system or the server 
determines the validity of the received login request message 
and decides whether to accept the access of the user or not. So, 
after the server has received the message M, it carries out the 
following steps: 
1. Checks the validity of IDi. If the format of the IDi is 
incorrect, the server rejects the request. 
2. Checks whether CIDi′ = CIDi holds or not, where, CIDi′  = 
f(IDi ⊕ d). If the result is positive, the following steps are 
performed otherwise the request is rejected. 
3. Checks whether the condition (T′-T) ≤ ΔT holds or not, 
where T′ is the timestamp of receiving the login request 
message and ΔT is the legitimate time interval allowed for the 
transmission delay. If negative rejects the request. 
4. Checks the equation, Yie = IDi•Xi f(CIDi ,T) mod n. If it holds, 
then the remote server accepts the login request and gives 
access to the Ui 
5. Now, it computes R = (f(CIDi, T′′))d mod n where, T′′ is the 
current timestamp and returns M′ = {R, T′′} to the user Ui 
When the user receives the message M′, the verification of the 
server by Ui is done as follows: 
1. Checks the time valid interval, (T′′′-T′′) ≤ ΔT, where T′′′ is 
the timestamp of receiving the message M′. If it is positive, it 
goes forward otherwise, rejects the server message. 
2. Calculates R′ = Re mod n = (f(CIDi, T′′)d)e = f(CIDi, T′′). If 
the condition, R′ = f(CIDi, T′′) does not hold, then the remote 
server is rejected, otherwise the mutual verification is 
succeeded. 
 
4. Cryptanalysis of Shen et. al.’s Scheme  
 
Shen et. al.’s scheme [1] is vulnerable to forgery attacks in 
various ways. In this section we review some of the attacks 
and weaknesses of [1] to better understand how the 
countermeasures could be developed to ensure robust security 
for the authentication process. 
4.1   Attack Based on [9] and [6]  
As the attacker could intercept the login request message M = 
{IDi, CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, e, g, T} it can get the valid values of IDi 
and CIDi. Using these values it could launch the impersonation 
attack as follows: 
1. Let, a = f(CIDi, Tc) where Tc is the current timestamp. Use 
the Extended Euclidean algorithm to compute gcd(e, a) = 1. 
Let, u and v be the coefficients computed by the Extended 
Euclidean algorithm such that, e•u –a•v = 1 
2. Compute Xf = IDiv mod n 
3. Compute Yf = IDiu mod n 
4. Send the forged login request message Mf = {IDi, CIDi, Xf, Yf, 
n, e, g, Tc} and this request will eventually pass the 
authentication phase as, 
Yfe = IDie•u mod n 
 = IDi1+a•v mod n 
 = IDi•IDia•v mod n 
 = IDi•(Xf)a mod n 
 = IDi•(Xf) f(CIDi ,Tc) mod n 
In fact, this attack could be extended for gcd(e,a)=2,3,…. 
instead of only gcd(e, a) = 1.  
4.2   Yang et. al.’s Attack  
In this attack the attacker intercepts the message, M = {IDi, 
CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, e, g, T} and then: 
1. Finds a value w such that it satisfies, w•f(CIDi, Tf) = f(CIDi, 
T), where Tf denotes the attacker’s attack launching time. 
2. Computes the equation, Xf = Xiw = gri•PWi•w mod n 
3. Now, the attacker constructs the forged login request 
message as, Mf = {IDi, CIDi, Xf, Yi, n, e, g, Tf} 
This forged message eventually passes the authentication 
phase of [1] because: 
Yie = (Si•hiri•f(CIDi ,T))e mod n 
 = (IDid•gPWi• d• ri•f(CIDi ,T))e mod n 
 = IDi•gPWi• ri•f(CIDi ,T) mod n 
and, 
IDi•Xf f(CIDi , Tf) mod n = IDi•gri•PWi•w• f(CIDi ,Tf) mod n 
 = IDi•gPWi• ri•f(CIDi ,T) mod n 
4.3   Impersonation Attack Based on [8] 
An attacker can impersonate a legitimate user Ui, with identity 
IDi, following the procedure: 
1. Intercepts the login request message M = {IDi, CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, 
e, g, T}.  
2. Computes, IDf = IDi-1 mod n 
3. Now, the attacker submits the identity IDf and a random 
value as his password to the KIC to obtain a valid smart card 
with information {n, e, g, IDf, CIDf, Sk, hk and f(.)}. 
4. Since, in the registration phase, Si = IDid mod n and here, Sk 
= IDfd mod n = IDi-d mod n, the attacker can compute Si as, Si = 
Sk-1 mod n 
5. Chooses a random integer y. 
6. Sets, Xf = ye mod n and Yf = Si•y f(CIDi ,Tf) mod n where Tf is the 
timestamp for the login request from the attacker and sends the 
forged login message, Mf = {IDi, CIDi, Xf, Yf, n, e, g, Tf}. The 
request is validated as the login request from the user Ui 
because, 
Yfe = (Si•y f(CIDi ,Tf))e mod n 
 = IDied• y f(CIDi ,Tf)•e mod n 
 = IDi•(Xf) f(CIDi ,Tf) mod n 
4.4   Another Type of Forgery Attack 
The attacker can get the values of IDi and CIDi from the login 
request message from the valid user, and CIDi = f(IDi ⊕ d) is a 
fixed value for a particular login request from a user. The 
attacker could launch an attack using the following steps: 
1. Let, a = f(CIDi, Tf) where Tf is the attacker’s login 
timestamp. The attacker finds a value b such that, a•b ≡ 1 mod 
n 
2. It chooses a random integer k and computes, Yf = kf(CIDi ,Tf) 
mod n and sets Xf = IDi-b•ke mod n. 
3. Sends the forged login request message, Mf = {IDi, CIDi, Xf, 
Yf, n, e, g, Tf} 
4. The attacker could pass the first phase of the authentication 
phase as, 
Yfe = kf(CIDi ,Tf)•e mod n 
and, 
IDi•Xf f(CIDi , Tf) mod n = (IDi• IDi-b•ke) f(CIDi ,Tf) mod n 
 = IDi•IDi-1• kf(CIDi ,Tf)•e mod n 
 = kf(CIDi ,Tf)•e mod n 
 
5. Our Improved Scheme 
 
Like the scheme [1] our improved scheme also has three 
distinct but interrelated phases, registration phase, login phase 
and mutual authentication phase. We keep the registration 
phase same as [1] and improve the other phases to surmount 
the drawbacks mentioned earlier. So, after the registration 
phase is complete, Ui gets the information n, e, g, IDi, CIDi, Si, 
hi and f(.) written in the memory of the smart card. 
 
Login Phase. In the login phase, Ui attaches the smart card 
with the reader device and keys in his IDi and PWi. Then the 
smart card performs the following operations: 
1. Generates a random number ri and computes Xi and Yi as 
follows: 
Xi = gri•PWi mod n 
Yi = Si•hiri•f(CIDi ,T) mod n 
Zi =Xi ⊕ CIDi  ⊕ f(CIDi, Yi) 
Here, T is the current timestamp. 
2. Sends the login request message, M = {IDi, Yi, Zi, n, e, g, T} 
 
Mutual Authentication Phase. When the server gets the 
login request message, it performs the operations: 
1. Checks the validity of IDi. If the format of the IDi is 
incorrect, the server rejects the request. 
2. Checks whether the condition (T′-T) ≤ ΔT holds or not, 
where T′ is the timestamp of receiving the login request 
message and ΔT is the legitimate time interval allowed for the 
transmission delay. If negative rejects the request. 
3. Computes, CIDi′  = f(IDi ⊕ d) and val = f(CIDi′, Yi). Then, 
computes, Zi ⊕ CIDi′  ⊕ val which should generate the value 
of Xi as CIDi′  = f(IDi ⊕ d) = CIDi for the legitimate users. 
4. Checks the equation, Yie = IDi•Xi f(CIDi ,T) mod n. If it holds, 
then the remote server accepts the login request and gives 
access to the Ui, otherwise rejects the request. 
5. Once, the user Ui is authenticated by the server, to provide 
mutual authentication, the server now computes, R = (f(CIDi′, 
T′′))d mod n where, T′′ is the current timestamp and returns M′ 
= {R, T′′} to the user Ui 
After receiving the message M′  the user Ui, checks it as 
follows: 
1. Checks the time valid interval, (T′′′-T′′) ≤ ΔT, where T′′′ is 
the timestamp of receiving the message M′. If it is positive, it 
goes forward otherwise, rejects the server message. 
 
User Ui and Smart Card 
 
Registration Phase 
 
Choose and Submit: IDi and PWi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hold: n, e, g, IDi, CIDi, Si, hi and the 
one-way function f(.) 
 
 
Login Phase 
 
Generate: ri 
Xi = gri•PWi mod n 
Yi = Si•hiri•f(CIDi ,T) mod n 
Zi =Xi ⊕ CIDi  ⊕ f(CIDi, Yi) 
 
 
 
 
Send: M = {IDi, Yi, Zi, n, e, g, T} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authentication Phase (2) 
 
Check: T′′ 
R′ = Re mod n = (f(CIDi, T′′)d)e = f(CIDi, 
T′′) 
If, R′ = f(CIDi, T′′) 
Accept Otherwise Reject 
 Key Information Center (KIC) 
 
 
 
p, q and n=p•q 
e,d, g 
e•d ≡ 1 (mod (p-1)(q-1))  
Si = IDid mod n 
hi = gPWi• d mod n 
CIDi = f(IDi ⊕ d) 
 
Store in the smart card: n, e, g, IDi, 
CIDi, Si, hi and f(.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authentication Server 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authentication Phase (1) 
 
Check: IDi, T 
CIDi′  = f(IDi ⊕ d) 
val = f(CIDi′, Yi) 
Find Probable,  
Xi = Zi ⊕ CIDi′  ⊕ val 
Check:  
Yie = IDi•Xi f(CIDi ,T) mod n 
If positive,  
Accept and Proceed Otherwise,  
Reject and Terminate 
 
R = (f(CIDi′, T′′))d 
Send: M′ = {R, T′′} 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Our Mutual Authnetication Scheme 
 
2. Calculates R′ = Re mod n = (f(CIDi, T′′)d)e = f(CIDi, T′′). If 
the condition, R′ = f(CIDi, T′′) does not hold, then the remote 
server is rejected, otherwise the mutual authentication is 
succeeded. 
 
Password Renewal. If Ui needs to change his password, he 
has to go through the registration phase where he submits his 
identity and the new password and accordingly the KIC 
performs the steps 5 to 8 for generating the information for 
that particular user. 
 
Our scheme is shown at a glance in Figure 1. 
 
6. Analysis of Our Scheme 
 
In this section, we analyze our scheme. First, we discuss the 
mode of operations and the structure of our scheme. Then, 
considering the cryptanalysis of Shen et. al.’s scheme, we 
show how our scheme could resist the known attacks. 
   We know that, the registration phase sets the base of the 
authentication process. After the KIC writes the required 
information into the smart card’s memory, the smart card 
works for the user. When any legitimate user attaches the card 
with the remote device and needs to login to the system, his ID 
and password are used to generate the cryptic information for 
starting the mutual authentication process. Three parameters 
are generated in the login phase in our scheme; Xi, Yi and Zi. 
The values of Xi and Yi are different for each individual user 
and depend on the values of IDi, CIDi and password for a 
particular user. The random value ri randomizes the outputs of 
these parameters from session to session for a particular user 
so that the outputs could not be same for each new login 
attempt from the user. The third parameter Zi is basically used 
to hide the value of Xi and CIDi. As CIDi is fixed for a 
particular user, if it is sent in plain format, the attacker could 
employ some other techniques to deduce some important 
information and thus could do harm to the legitimate user. In 
fact, we have shown that some of the attacks on [1] could be 
launched because of snatching the value of CIDi (of a valid 
user) by the adversaries. 
   While sending the login request message in our scheme, total 
number of parameters used is seven, instead of eight required 
for Shen et. al.’s scheme. This obviously reduces the message 
size if all the other parameters are considered to be of the same 
sizes as in [1]. We use the login request message, M = {IDi, Yi, 
Zi, n, e, g, T}. By examining the structure of the login request 
message, it is evident that, there is little information available 
for an adversary that could be useful for launching any of the 
previously presented attacks. As Zi hides the value of CIDi by 
mingling (i.e. with XOR Operations) with Xi and f(CIDi, Yi), 
there is no possible way for an adversary to find out the proper 
value of CIDi for a legitimate user. The adversary can at best 
get the value of Yi, from the login request message, but as Xi 
and CIDi are not known, it cannot decipher any of the actual 
values from the available information. 
   In our authentication phase, we have mainly two sub-phases. 
In the first sub-phase, the server verifies the authenticity of the 
user whereas in the second sub-phase, the user verifies the 
authenticity of the server message. At the time of user 
verification, the server first checks the ID and time constraints, 
then calculating Zi ⊕ CIDi′  ⊕ val must generate the value of Xi 
for a legitimate user because: 
Zi ⊕ CIDi′  ⊕ val 
= Xi ⊕  CIDi  ⊕  f(CIDi, Yi) ⊕ CIDi′  ⊕ val 
= Xi ⊕   f(CIDi, Yi) ⊕ val 
= Xi ⊕   f(CIDi, Yi) ⊕ f(CIDi′, Yi) = Xi 
Calculated CIDi′  = f(IDi ⊕ d) = CIDi, must be hold for a 
legitimate user. Note that, as the value of d is not public, this 
value could not be calculated by anyone except the legitimate 
server. After finding the possible value of Xi, we check the 
condition, Yie = IDi•Xi f(CIDi ,T) mod n and validity of this ensures 
the authenticity of the user requesting for access. 
   To start the second sub-phase of authentication, after getting 
the message M′ from the user, the server checks the condition, 
R′ = f(CIDi, T′′) which must hold for legal users as according 
to our assumption, e•d ≡ 1 mod (p-1)(q-1). 
   Now, considering some of the common attacks, we show 
how our scheme could perform well. 
 
Replay Attack: A replay attack is a form of network attack in 
which an attacker maliciously or fraudulently does the 
repeated or delayed transmission of a valid data [11], [12]. 
This is carried out either by the originator or by an adversary 
who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as a part of 
a masquerade attack. In our scheme, replay attack is not 
possible as repetition of an old login request message will be 
detected by the server in the step 2 of the mutual 
authentication phase. 
 
Forged Login or Forged Server Attack. Most of the attacks 
and weaknesses for Shen et. al. [1] scheme are found as the 
attackers could get the values of IDi, CIDi, Xi, Yi and T by 
intercepting the login request message. In our scheme, the 
values of Xi and CIDi are kept secret at the time of 
communication over insecure channel and are not available to 
the eavesdropper to use these for replacing them with other 
values. In fact, forging or replacing other values will be 
detected in the mutual authentication phase and eventually the 
request will be rejected. From the server side, the message R 
could not be generated by the attacker as d is not public and is 
kept secret only by the server. Even in this case, time stamping 
eliminates the chance of any sort of replay attack using the 
server message.  
 
Impersonation: In our scheme, there is no way that an attacker 
could carry out an impersonation attack. Considering the 
impersonation attacks mentioned in section 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4, 
we could infer that, these attacks are not applicable against our 
scheme. Let us consider the impersonation attack presented in 
section 4.3. From the attacker’s side: 
1. It Intercepts the login request message. In our scheme it is, 
M = {IDi, Yi, Zi, n, e, g, T}.  
2. Computes, IDf = IDi-1 mod n 
3. Now, the attacker submits the identity IDf and a random 
value as his password to the KIC to obtain a valid smart card 
with information {n, e, g, IDf, CIDf, Sk, hk and f(.)}. 
4. Since, in the registration phase, Si = IDid mod n and here, Sk 
= IDfd mod n = IDi-d mod n, the attacker can compute Si as, Si = 
Sk-1 mod n 
5. Chooses a random integer y. 
6. Now, this step could not be performed as we do not expose 
the value of the parameter Xi. We have shown earlier that, this 
value is concealed in a way that could not be deduced by the 
adversary. At this point, the adversary could at best replace the 
value of Yi with, Yf = Si•y f(CIDi ,Tf) mod n but, that simply does 
not make any sense and even the first phase of authentication 
could not be passed in any way. 
   So, the adversary cannot be able to impersonate as the legal 
user Ui. The attacker is allowed even to replace the value of Zi, 
but without the proper values, any of such attempts can never 
pass the authentication phase. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
   In this paper, we have shown the weaknesses and different 
types of attacks on Shen et. al. scheme including a new type of 
attack. We have presented our improved scheme which could 
successfully defend all sorts of attacks mentioned earlier. We 
have presented in the related works section that, the other 
schemes in this area are more or less vulnerable to the attacks 
that are mentioned in this paper. Our scheme ensures robust 
security at the time of communication over the insecure 
channel and keeps all the other advantages that were present in 
the previous scheme. 
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